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[Continued from our previous issue]
VII. SOOL AND EASTERN SANAAG REGIONS
On the eve of the presidential election, the NEC decided that voting would not take place in much of Sool and eastern Sanaag regions, and parts of Buhoodle district (Togdheer region) for security reasons. The closure of polling stations in those areas meant that a total of 785 polling stations were actually functioning on Election Day out of 902 stations planned - equivalent to 87 per cent of the total. Although widely perceived as a setback to the political process, democracy in Somaliland probably would have suffered a far greater blow had voting in those regions gone ahead: elections in Sool and eastern Sanaag would have almost certainly featured fraud and bloodshed on a large scale.
A. SOMALILAND AND THE HARTI
Somaliland’s eastern border regions, inhabited mainly by the Harti clans (Dhulbahante and Warsengeli), have long been problematic. Despite having signed both the 1991 declaration of independence and its reaffirmation at the 1993 Boorama conference, the Harti leadership remains ambivalent about Somaliland’s claim to separate statehood. Like the Gadabursi, key members of the Harti clans were identified with the leadership of the Siyaad Barre regime during the civil war (although a handful chose to align themselves instead with the SNM). Unlike the Gadabursi, however, the Dhulbahante and Warsengeli negotiated separate ceasefires with the SNM without the latter’s forces having to enter their areas.
Since the mid-1990s, the Warsengeli relationship with Somaliland’s leadership has been mediated largely by the clan’s senior elder, Suldaan (Sultan) Sa’id Suldaan Abdiselam Mohamud Ali Shire. Together with some influential Warsengeli political figures, the Suldaan has kept the Warsengeli closely tied to Somaliland – a task in which history has worked in his favour. Despite their Darood affiliation, the main Warsengeli trading centre has historically been Ceerigaabo, a town in which members of the clan intermingled freely with the Isaaq and developed enduring social and economic ties. Only from 1989 onwards, when the Barre regime completed the tarmac road from Garoowe to Bosaaso, did the latter begin to rival Ceerigaabo as the focus of Warsengeli social and commercial activity. Suldaan Sa’id has faced a persistent challenge from his uncle, a former rival for the Suldaan’s traditional title, who has worked with only modest success to associate the Warsengeli with Puntland and Mogadishu.
The chief architect of the Dhulbahante relationship with Somaliland has been another traditional elder: Garaad Abdiqani. An SNM sympathiser during the 1980s, Abdiqani’s offer to form a united front with the Isaaq against the Barre regime was rebuffed by the SNM, although he retained close ties with the Isaaq rebels and played a key role in securing the 1991 ceasefire. Abdiqani went on to lead the Dhubahante delegations to the 1991 Burco conference and the 1993 Boorama conference, but became progressively disaffected following the appointment of a Gadabursi to the post of Vice President and a subsequent dispute with President Egal over the 1996 Hargeysa conference arrangements. Having abandoned the Somaliland cause, Abdiqani was instrumental in shifting much of Dhulbahante political and public opinion behind the establishment of the Puntland administration, where the clan received the post of Vice President and a large share of parliamentary seats. The honeymoon with Puntland did not last long, and in 2001 a new focus for Dhulbahante loyalty emerged with the formation of a Somali Transitional National Government (TNG) at Arta, Djibouti.
Garaad Abdiqani, however, shares the leadership of the Dhulbahante with several other key traditional figures, notably Garaad Suleyman and Garaad Isma’il, who represent different lineages within the Dhulbahante, and who have been more consistent in their support for Somaliland. No less than eight other senior ‘traditional’ leaders, many of them created by the Barre regime, also compete for Dhulbahante loyalties, preventing the clan from adopting a unified position on any major issue.
At present, Harti loyalties are split at least three ways, with members of the clan’s political and traditional elite scattered between Somaliland, Puntland and Mogadishu. Some have sampled all three. “The people are divided,” an intellectual in Laas Caanood explained to ICG. “Even brothers: one is here, one is there. The same with cousins, clans, sub clans… one is here, one is there”.
The process of democratisation in Somaliland has generally aggravated these divisions: what some Harti leaders perceive as an opportunity to advance their own interests and those of their clan, others perceive as an Isaaq Trojan Horse, intended to co-opt the Dhulbahante through subterfuge. The conduct of the 2001 referendum reinforced these misgivings, since many ‘yes’ votes returned from Harti areas were obtained by ballot stuffing (over 6,000 presumably genuine ‘no’ votes were also cast) by pro-Somaliland officials.
Rayale’s visit to Laas Caanood in December 2002, which ended in a shoot-out between his bodyguard and militia sent by Puntland leader Abdillahi Yusuf to assassinate him, reinforced the Dhulbahante sense of alienation. After the visit, Rayale imposed a state of emergency on Sool region, only to lift it in time for the local elections. “It became clear that he just wanted to create problems”, a former member of the Guurti told ICG. “When he lifted the state of emergency [to allow voting to go ahead] it could only mean that the man wanted to create trouble, for people to kill each other”.
Following his abortive visit to Laas Caanood, Rayale gave orders that certain Somaliland officials should be withdrawn to the nearby town of Caynabo, ostensibly in order to avoid provoking a further clash. The resulting vacuum permitted the Puntland leadership to expand its presence in the town and for at least a week before the presidential poll, militia loyal to Abdillahi Yusuf had been pouring into the eastern regions with the aim of disrupting the election. “Puntland has brought a lot of forces here”, a Laas Caanood resident told ICG.
“They want to prevent a single ballot being cast, and there are insufficient Somaliland forces here to prevent that”. A senior Dhulbahante traditional leader believed the Puntland leader’s motives were even more sinister: “Abdillahi wants to bring the Puntland war here to Laas Caanood, sending so many vehicles here, so many troops”.
Tension was running especially high in Las
Caanood. With some Dhulbahante leaders determined to hold the election and
others equally determined to prevent it, many residents expected violence.
None expected a free and fair poll. “The only two choices are for people to
kill one another at polling stations, or to carry the boxes on their backs
to a safe place and stuff them with ballot papers. At this time we cannot
have a free fair and clean election here”.
The NEC was well aware of the problem, having sent several missions to Harti
areas in the weeks before the poll. With less than 72 hours remaining before
the election was scheduled to take place, the commission reached the
decision that there would be no voting in Harti areas. A local electoral
official explained the reasoning to ICG: “Someone who votes has the right to
vote in security. He must know that he can cast his vote independently and
freely. For that, there must be administration and police. There are 87
polling stations in areas where there is no administration and no police, so
the preconditions for voting do not exist”. Not all Somaliland’s leaders
approved of the NEC’s decision. Just days before the election Kulmiye
chairman Silanyo was adamant that voting should go forward: “Voting is a
right that people of a country have, that every citizen has. It’s one matter
to deny people that right. It’s another matter if people chose whether to
exercise that right or not”. But even though the NEC decision effectively
disenfranchised the majority of the Harti, many still managed to vote: in
Burco and Ceerigaabo districts, election observers witnessed Warsengeli and
Dhulbahante turning out to vote en masse.
The NEC’s decision not to force the issue and to suspend polling in
disturbed areas probably spared the region much bloodshed. It also curtailed
efforts by UDUB supporters to rig the vote: just weeks prior to the
election, Rayale created five new ministerial posts for Dhulbahante and
Warsengeli supporters and sent them campaigning to the east.
“The government doesn’t want the vote here, just rigging and ballot
stuffing”, a local official told ICG at the time. “People are hungry. It’s
jilaal [the long dry season]. If you give some money, even the polling
station staff can be persuaded”. The Somaliland public made light of the
matter, referring to Rayale’s new appointees as “ballot box ministers”, but
the ploy did little to burnish UDUB’s democratic credentials. “No election
under such circumstances could be free and fair,” one of the commissioners
later told ICG. “Like the [2001] referendum, ministers just wanted to take
boxes and stuff them”.
To be continued.
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