The UN And Somalia: The Tragic Tale Of Successive Failures

By Medhane Tadesse

Those of us who criticized the UN on Somalia from the outset can take no comfort from its catastrophic failures and consequences. The UN has always claimed that intervention in Somalia is marred by a lot of risks. With the debacle in early 1990’s such an excuse was generally accepted. But the UN failed to act even when there were no risks at all, such as when the TFG was first established and later when it reached Mogadishu after the military defeat of the Islamists. With the shameful memory in the very recent past, in 2004 and early 2007, the likely consequences of inaction seemed obvious and far outweighed the risks of intervention. And now the same excuses are being presented as a precondition for possible UN involvement in Somalia. Earlier last week the UN chief, Ban Ki Moon has released a report in response to calls for greater UN involvement in Somalia made by the AU and some members of the Security Council. He said in a report issued Tuesday that he was prepared to recommend sending UN peacekeepers to strife-torn Somalia if some key conditions are met.

The conditions include ‘a viable and inclusive political process and an agreement on the cessation of hostilities’. Moreover I find the preconditions utterly dishonest. They have come at a time when the Somali capital, Mogadishu, has seen almost daily gun battles between Islamist insurgents and Somali and Ethiopian security forces. The UN like the rest of us knows for sure that a ceasefire is unlikely to happen. Besides, had the UN decided to get involved in early 2004 and later early 2007 when the Union of Islamic Courts were routed all the problems being listed as impediments for its involvement in Somalia would not have been created in the first place. The UN stood by and watched while the security problems were being accumulated, but to the very end. The first concerns that the UN is partly responsible for what is happening in Somalia right now. And secondly the UN knows that one of the parties to the conflict is not interested in a ceasefire. Why then is the UN coming up with an extremely difficult proposition? Equally the UN tabled political reconciliation and the formation of an inclusive government as a major precondition for the implementation of its ‘contingency plan’ of peacekeeping in Somalia. Things go wrong, and not just in Somalia. Except that when it comes to Somalia the UN seems to have come with wrong solutions at wrong times. Moreover, little of what Ban Ki Moon has to say about Somalia will come as news to many readers. Both the conditions and the so-called contingency plan are nothing new. It is incredible to see how a new UN Secretary General continues to be seduced by the disastrous policies of the world organization on Somalia.

Those of us who favor political negotiations as opposed to military solutions to resolve the Somali crisis- not because they flatter our good intentions but because they do good and prevent ill- could not coherently be sorry to see the TFG unable to achieve it. Because we know for sure that an extremist core of the insurgency is not interested in the language of political dialogue. Apparently, the current Prime Minister Nur Adde of the TFG was speaking in a reconciliatory tone, and was making statements that were not in the TFG vocabulary book and contrast to the TFG’s position on many issues and audaciously different than his predecessor’s aggressive and arrogant display of authority, and in so doing, he attracted the attention of all of us. All the same the extremists in the opposition do not welcome him. And those of us who object to the continued exercise of military power by the TFG and its Ethiopian allies are being reminded that there may not be another alternative at all. After pushing the TFG to adopt a reconciliatory tone just months ago we would have been delighted to see someone from the opposition, those busy making statements in Asmara or beheading people in Mogadishu-anyone-accept at least in principle reconciliation as a path to resolving the impasse. This has become just wishful thinking.

The fact of the matter is that under no circumstances would the insurgents, mainly the al-Shabab, seek a negotiated settlement to the crisis in Somalia. This they have expressed is loud and clear. And yet they are the ones who are creating havoc and violence. Without dealing with them one cannot see an improvement in the security situation. The UN’s call for a ceasefire or political reconciliation can only make so much sense if there is a similar willingness from the opposition. As such Ban Ki Moon has nothing to offer by way of a solution. And his disillusioned tone can thus take on a cynical edge. The tragedy of peace in Somalia today is that the group, which is crucial to a ceasefire and an end to violence, the al-Shabab, is not at all ready to talk. As a consequence, the TFG and the al-Shabab are in each other’s throats and will continue to fight until one of them is defeated. This being the case what are the options left to the international community? And the recent statement of the UN performs the salutary function of reminding us just how troubling such dilemmas can be.

And those of us who, correctly in my view, point to the perverse consequences of extremism have not always applied that insight in cases where we longed to see a negotiated settlement. As for the toothless and indecisive United Nations not only is it unable to support a secular and legitimate government gather some strength and prevent extremists from becoming a source of regional and global insecurity, but by its obsession with remaining” impartial” and protecting its infinite excuses it can sometimes abet and facilitate violence and conflict.

Medhane Tadesse of CPRD is a long time specialist on issues of peace and security in the Horn of Africa. He can be reached at mt3002et@yahoo.com